A StratPak Analysis of the Geopolitics of the Himalayas
 |
Muhammad Osama Shafiq
Founder & Chairman, StratPak
|
General Bipin Rawat committed the same kind of error. In a June 2017 interview to the ANI, the former Indian Army Chief had declared his army’s preparedness for a two-and-a-half front war. The two fronts being Pakistan and China, while the half-front referred to over a dozen movements of self-determination in India. Despite this provocative statement, General Rawat had acknowledged that not even a single bullet had been fired between China and India over the past 40 years.
A week later, the People’s Liberation Army started road construction in Doklam Plateau. The Doklam lies between China’s Chumbi Valley in the north, Bhutan’s Ha Valley in the east, and the Indian-controlled Sikkim in the west. Bhutan considers the plateau as its sovereign territory. It invited India to intervene under the Friendship Treaty, renewed in 2007.
The ensuing dispute lasted for 73 days, until late August that year. After the Indian intervention, China agreed to stop road construction in the region. Indian media claimed that China’s laxed action was forced by the Indian Army’s quick response to Bhutan’s call. However, analysts link it to Xi Jinping’s interest in avoiding a diplomatic row with India ahead of the 9th BRICS Summit. A failed BRICS at Xiamen might have put Xi Jinping’s re-election at the 19th Party Congress in doubt.
Buoyed by India’s muted response and the lack of American resolve, China continued to deploy troops. It also built observation posts on the Gipmochi ridge, overlooking the Siliguri Corridor. China’s position on the higher ground informed intelligence on the position and movement of Indian troops along India’s Chicken Neck, only 27 kilometres wide at its narrowest point.
General Rawat also confirmed China’s ‘other’ infrastructure development. Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman later verified that China had built sentry posts, trenches and helipads in the Doklam. Indian envoy to China termed it as an attempt to change the status quo in the region.
China declared it a sovereign right over its territory and rebuffed Indian envoy’s claims. In March 2018, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying responded that India should have learnt the lesson in Doklam. Unlike Russia’s brazen annexation of Crimea, China managed the Doklam Crisis and avoided international backlash.
After February 2018 elections, Nepal Communist Party asserted its control of the government. Nepal is an important actor in the Himalayas. Its domestic political landscape is of core national security interest to India. Nepal has an eastern border with Sikkim, western border with Uttarakhand, and its northern border runs along China’s Tibet.
Historically, India has had amicable ties with Nepal. More than a million Nepali immigrants work in India. They send remittance close to $1 billion every year. But since the Communist Party came in power, Nepal has seen a resurgence in the nationalist and anti-India sentiments. Nepali Parliament recently approved a map showing Lipulekh, Limpyadhura and Kala Pani as its territories. The former is the shortest route between Tibet and Uttarakhand.
China and Nepal settled all their border disputes in 1960. Since then, the relation has been peaceful. Nepal continued to play a balancing role between China and India. However, the relationship between communist-run Nepal and China may surprise the observers. Apart from North Korea, China does not have a particularly good history of friendly relations with its communist neighbours.
The Soviets used to send spies. The US sends ‘aid’ and NGOs. In April this year, America sent $500 million aid to Nepal to ‘enhance democracy’. Nepali Parliament was split over the decision to take or reject the aid, as any choice may have serious implications on its relationship with China.
In April 2018, the Supreme Court of India declared that Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, granting special status to Jammu and Kashmir, had become a permanent feature of the constitution. The court had virtually ruled out the abrogation of the article, and restricted Delhi’s control over the future of the disputed territory.
In August next year, the Indian Parliament revoked the article as well as the Article 35A, which provided special privileges to the residents of the said territory. In late October, the centre government reorganized the territory into two new states of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. On the sidelines of the UNGA session held in September 2019, the Indian Prime Minister’s move to annex held-Kashmir was met by a pat on the back by the US President Donald Trump. He lauded Modi’s effort in ‘uniting a torn country’.
The move was received with jubilation by the locals in Ladakh. As the dust settled, there was confusion and hostility towards the Parliament’s decision. Among other human rights violations, people in Jammu and Kashmir were afraid of the ongoing demographic shift in the region, facilitated by the revocation of Article 35A.
Many residents of Ladakh also felt looted as becoming a Union Territory had deprived them of the special rights granted to them as Scheduled Tribes. The residents of Ladakh had long preferred peace and preservation of their ecology. They were concerned that the economic prosperity would bring in an influx of workers, tourists, and settlers in the region, disturbing the delicate balance of ecology in Ladakh.
People in Ladakh were particularly unhappy about the quality of communication systems available to them. On the Indian side of the 830 kilometres long Line of Actual Control (LAC), local landline phone access was restricted; the Chinese on ‘their side of Ladakh’ enjoyed 5G connectivity.
Professor Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University has analyzed the BJP-led government’s wisdom behind going against the Supreme Court decision on the disputed territory. Dr Ganguly believes that the Doklam crisis provided the impetus to revoke the Articles 370, and Article 35A.
China’s forward force-posturing near Siliguri Corridor necessitated India’s response near China’s restive regions, Tibet and Xinjiang. Therefore, the annexation was not much for ‘uniting a torn country’ but out of sheer necessity for the core national security interest of India.
The Himalayas are only 50-60 million years old. They are rigid enough to stop the advance of large military force but porous enough to allow the flow of culture and economy. The advancement in military logistics, particularly the Iron Horse, has enabled the flow of large military force over high altitudes and long distances.
Colonial India’s northern borders were set at the Himalayas, the youngest mountains in the world. But modern Indian strategists envision a trans-Himalayan security apparatus for India. They cite the spread of Indic-religions and cultural history as the main sources of inspiration. With an efficient system of roads and rail-roads, the Indian military force is trying to make headway in the mountain passes.
In April last year, India had got down on the business of stepping-up the logistical capabilities in Ladakh. It pulled in labourers from nearby high-altitude states, much to the resentment of the locals. India hastened the construction of roads and bridges in Ladakh. The military also started working on the new airstrips in the region.
India’s strategic designs were not going unnoticed. China was already discontent with the ongoing construction of 323 kilometres long Durbuk Shyok Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) Road. The road passes just 8 kilometres from the LAC. Chinese troops in the area were alarmed by the Indian military’s logistical expansion in the region.
In late May 2020, Indian troops exchanged physical blows with the Chinese soldiers at the Sikkim-Tibet border, some 1300 kilometres away from the Ladakh. In response, the Chinese troops positioned themselves on the high ground along the northern borders of Ladakh and Uttarakhand. In the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops halted their patrols and established themselves on the ridges overlooking the position of Indian troops across the LAC.
The China-India border has no precise demarcation in these parts of the world. China does not recognize the lines drawn on the world map by colonial cartographers. The recent unpleasantness between China and India took place at the Flash Point 44 on the eve of June 15, 2020. Indian troops marched 8 kilometres from their positions, went near the LAC and demanded their Chinese counterparts pull back from the ridges. The dialogue between the two sides soon turned into violent hand-to-hand combat with regular volleys of stones.
The clash took place inside the Indian held-territory but near the Chinese trenches; their troops had the advantage of the defence. India reported the loss of 20 soldiers and officers, some even plunging to death in the sub-zero water of the nearby Pangong Tso. Chinese casualties were in single-digit; although the official statement did not mention casualties on the Chinese side.
It was the first deadly clash between the two nations in over 45 years. The ‘unpreparedness’ of the Indian troops revealed the lack of flexibility in the Indian military organization. The Indian officers on the ground had little autonomy to take operational or tactical decisions. They had to follow the rigid instructions coming from the high command. It only conforms with Pakistan’s stance that ceasefire violations across the Line of Control (LoC) are sanctioned by top politico-military leadership of India.
Indian generals are reluctant to engage with the Chinese forces in the Galwan Valley because they consider it a ‘dispersive ground’. Moreover, the Indian government takes pride in its diplomacy. India downplayed China’s forward force posturing along the LAC, in a bid to allow its diplomacy to settle the issue.
As the world governments battled COVID-19, India tried to lump Chinese offensive in Ladakh with the ‘Wuhan’ virus. Moreover, it has been a vocal supporter of Muslims in Xinjiang, and Buddhists in Tibet. India has blamed China for the demographic shift in the regions, as well as the ‘re-education’ of their peoples. India commits the same crimes in held-Kashmir.
India tried to kindle hate against China by presenting it as an irresponsible, repressive and aggressive actor. However, the world governments were less interested in the event at Ladakh and more involved in saving the lives at home. China, on the other hand, saw the preoccupation of world leaders as an opportunity to subdue the Indian military in the Himalayas.
Indian media hailed Australia’s vague allegations of a state-sponsored hacking attack as a triumph of their diplomatic corps. But India’s Quad-ally deliberately did not name names. A resources-giant like Australia depends upon a resource-consuming manufacturing hub like China. It is China’s China. It exports $85 billion to China every year. Australia is among the few countries in the world that have a trade surplus with China.
Modi had a greater agenda than saving and honouring the lives of his soldiers. By responding to Chinese intrusions only vocally with Bollywood-Esque rhyming slogans, the Indian PM indicated to the world that his country was not the aggressor and transgressor in the Himalayas. Modi is building up India’s image as a preserver of Himalayan cultures, religions, peace, and natural landscape. India also hosts the Tibetan government in exile at Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh.
In a choice between economy and security, Modi had preferred economy and appeased China. He did not flex his 56-inch pectoral muscles. But he must not be mistaken as “Surrender Modi”. He is a cold, power-politician. His calm tactic is not without reason. The Himalayas, particularly Tibet is the water-tower of Asia. Modi also campaigns to defeat Global Warming in the Himalayas.
India is robustly building dams on the rivers originating from Tibet under the guise of a war against Global Warming. However, India cares little for the lower-riparian states like Pakistan and Bangladesh. Time and again, India has violated the spirit of International Riparian Law. It ignores the recommendations of the International Court of Arbitration. India releases lower amounts of water in the Indus, and by the same reckoning in the Ganges-Brahmaputra as well.
India’s nonchalant behaviour is damaging the marine life and the ecology of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. It is severely hurting the life-cycle of hundreds of millions in Pakistan and Bangladesh. If India continues its fight against Global Warming in the same manner, it will only create an environmental refugee crisis on a global scale.
On the half-front, India is facing demographic challenges. It is already marred by movements of self-determination in the Red Corridor, the Seven Sisters, Khalistan, and Jammu and Kashmir. These movements have reduced the Indian Army to an internal policing force. Therefore, the American geopolitical analyst George Friedman calls India ‘a union of forty remnants of British Imperialism’.
There is a lack of consensus against China in India. Three weeks into the crisis and the Indian Parliament is yet to denounce China’s actions. Delhi’s guarantee as a net security provider to the union territories has been dealt a serious blow by China’s incursions in Ladakh. Interior states have nowhere to go. Among the prominent periphery states, only West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has come in support of Delhi.
The coastal states are closely analyzing the guarantee provided by Delhi. Most of these states are economically more developed than the interior. They contribute large sums to the Indian budget where defence spending takes a hefty chunk. The periphery states may look elsewhere, or build their security apparatus independent of Delhi.
Maharashtra government signed a $1 billion Memorandum of Understanding with three Chinese companies for the investment in the electronics and automobile sector. The agreement, now put on hold but not cancelled, was signed on June 15, hours before the deadly violence began in the Galwan Valley.
Modi’s news mantra “be vocal for local” is a far cry from realization. Indian economists concede that India simply cannot cut off supply chains with China. They argue that it is a no-brainer for India. It must overlook the border clash, and consider the entire matrix of the relationship. The cooperative and competitive element of the Sino-Indian relation has divided the experts.
India’s pharmaceutical industry has 70% dependence on Chinese equipment and medicine. India’s electronics market has 38% reliance on China. Its booming export sector, the automobile industry depends roughly 25% on imports and investments from China. Therefore, the economists suggest that boycotting China is not feasible, and not possible because Modi’s ‘Make in India’ depends heavily on made in China goods.
India has put a ‘temporary’ ban on 59 Chinese smart-phone applications. These apps bring in billions of dollars for the Chinese companies, and India is their largest market. Likewise, many Indian consumers of these apps are the largest content producers. They earn millions of dollars collectively week in, week out. Such a ban will create challenges arising from restraints on economic freedom, and freedom of expression of the people in ‘liberal’ India.
China has great commercial interests based in India. If the relationship between China and India continue to suffer, China will have to protect its commercial interests in India. This largely includes the coastal states where Chinese companies have put in massive investments. Incidentally, some of these states are part of the Red Corridor as well.
India is doing its utmost to extend its security apparatus beyond the Himalayas. China’s vulnerability lies beyond these mountains where two of its largest autonomous regions with nervy sentiments are open to India. Learning from the American Offensive Realists, the Chinese strategists duly understand that the cost of a small-scale decisive conflict in the short-term will be much lower than any large-scale unyielding war in the future.
Therefore, China went into the Himalayas to take India’s attention away from the ocean, where India may develop a credible capability to challenge Chinese interests. China recognizes that Ladakh is a ‘land of intersecting highways’. It has an ally in the area. The Chinese generals know that any adventure in Ladakh will rely on support from Pakistan. China’s necessity has only has raised stakes for Pakistan.
In a conflict between China and India at Ladakh, Pakistan has the most favourable odds. India recognizes that as well. Indian media falsely claimed that Pakistan had provided access to Chinese aircraft in Skardu airbase, the most forward such facility. Pakistan was concerned that after the Galwan disgrace, Indian army may look for redemption and face-saving at the LoC. Anticipating aggression from India, Pakistan also mobilized its troops. However, Pakistan’s generally laid-back response is intelligible since it does not want to own another foreign conflict.
Geopolitics of Himalayas goes hand in hand with the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India is enhancing its capability to be a maritime power. It is in the process of building a blue-water navy. It sits on the world’s busiest sea-lanes of trade, and it does little overland trade with any of its neighbours. Its trade security relies on distant markets in the US and Europe. However, India does not have a navy to protect its maritime interests.
India has one aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya. It is a $3 billion liability without its support vessels, trained sailors and educated admirals. A carrier battle group may consist of twenty different vessels, ranging from battleships, destroyers, missile cruisers, submarines, supply ships, survey ships and corvettes.
Having ships is one thing. It takes decades to train and acclimatize, sailors and admirals to command those ships, and to weather the storms. Then it takes an unusually long time to train admirals who can command a carrier battle group or a group of such battle groups. In short-to-mid term, Indian navy cannot challenge China’s maritime interests in the IOR.
Similarly, the PLA Navy is not a highly capable force as yet. China is also in the process of modernizing its modest merchant navy. Therefore, China has developed a clever tactic. It raises the cost of engagement for its adversaries. It sends fishing boats to claim islands in the South China Sea. In response, the US mobilizes the Seventh Fleet.
Many Indian policymakers believe that the US is in decline. A few months ago, the Indian Minister for External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar addressed a conference titled “Pax Sinica” at the Raisina Institute. He expressed hope that China and India’s mutual culture of soft power will be the best suited to establish peace in the world. However, he expressed his desire that the world enters an Indian peace sans China.
Despite the ongoing forty-sixty split between the Atlantic and the Pacific, American strategists still see northern European Plain as America’s greatest geopolitical vulnerability. In Asia, commander of the Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris had declared North Korea as America’s greatest challenge because of the unpredictable nature of its leader. Moreover, the protection of Taiwan is paramount to American interests against China since it is America’s ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’.
Needless to say that Ladakh is the new Vietnam where American guarantee will be tested. The presence of American boots on the ground will be difficult to sustain for the pride of ‘incredible’ India. India seeks a greater partnership of equals with the US. Whether India falls or China, it only serves the purpose of the United States. It is only about the elimination of a potential peer-competitor. Therefore, it will be wise of India not to rely on external assistance for its core national security agenda.
Allies of today can be enemies of tomorrow. That is the iron law of international politics. The outcome of Ladakh conflict may create a common goods problem between Pakistan and China. The choice of the ally is obvious for Pakistan, but the terms of lending support can be negotiated.
ASSLAM U ALAIKUM
ReplyDeleteExcellent analysis
MashaAllah g bht khoob jnb......
ReplyDelete